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Peruvian Domestic Law Aspects of
the La Brea y Parifias Controversy
By DALE B. FuRNSii*

In the renowned La Brea y Pariascontroversy, the North
American public has consistently assumed, Professor Furnish
says, that Peruacted arbitarilyin effectively renderingthe InternationalPetroleum Corporation without compensation for
the expropriated oilfield. The legal mechanism utilized was
granting IPC compensatory damages, but offsetting the award
with a restitutionaryclaim for the depletion of the resources of
the tract by IPC under a claim of title which Peru deems invalid. It is ProfessorFurnish'sview, elaboratedin this article,
that there is a solid basis in Peruvian domestic law for most
of what Peru has done in this affair.
On August 22, 1969, the Revolutionary Government of Peru
initiated the expropriation of all the property belonging to Stan-

dard Oil's wholly-owned subsidiary, the International Petroleum
Co., in Peru.' In practical effect the decree meant that an oil
* B.A., Grinell College, 1962; J.D., University of Iowa, 1965. Associate Professor of Law Arizona State University. Formerly Visiting Professor and SubDirector Chile Law Program, International Legal Center.
AVTHOR s NoTE. The author owes a great debt to a number of people who helped
provide information for this study, read drafts of the manuscript, and saved me
fom errors of law and fact. Probably more people spent time helping me than
should be necessary for any one law review article. However, the topic is an
extremely controversial one. Space does not permit a complete list of those to
whom my debt extends but I must acknowledge special attention, and immeasurable aid, from John Oldfield, Chief Counsel at the Esso Inter-America
office in Coral Gables, Florida, and Alberto Ruiz Eldridge, past President of the
Lima Bar Association and chief Peruvian government counsel in the controversy.
Both men, and all others on the two sides of the question, were most courteous
and conscientious in being sure I was provided with all the relevant information
available, even when I was pressing points they strongly disagreed with.
Finally, my debt extends to the International Legal Center of New York City,
which is an active and effective participant in beginning a revolution in Latin
American legal istitutions and gave me the opportunity to be in South America
with research time to dedicate to this study.
I Supreme Decree [hereinafter cited as S.D.] No. 014-EM/DGH of 22 August
1969. An explanation of what a supreme decree is in the Peruvian system may be
found
(1971),in Furnish, The Hierarchy of Peruvian Laws, - Am. J. Coup. L..
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extracting, refining, and distributing enterprise that for forty-four
years provided the majority of petroleum products and sales on
the domestic market ceased to exist in Peru. Virtually all of IPC's
property and functions are at present under the possession and
administration of the State oil company Petro'leos del Perg [hereinafter referred to as Petro-Peru].
The action of the Revolutionary Government did not come
unexpectedly. A series of recent legal events moved almost irreversibly to the final, total expropriation decreed that August. The
fundamental issues between Peru and IPC have revolved around
the La Brea y Pariiasoilfields in northern Peru, where IPC began
operations in 1924 as apparent owner of the subsoil rights under
the terms of a 1922 international arbitration award. Sporadic
political debate on the matter has continued ever since, building
to a level that thrust the La Brea y Parifias case to the forefront
of Peruvian public issues in the late 1950's and kept it there
throughout the last decade.
The issues, concepts, and language of the La Brea y Parifias
controversy should prove familiar to those who have studied the
expropriation of foreign petroleum and other mining operations
in Latin America. As in similar cases, La Brea y Parifias has
created a maelstrom of Peruvian law, United States and other
foreign law, international law both public and private, relations
between governments, relations between private enterprise and
governments, and domestic politics in several countries. Since
its assumption of power, the military government of Peru has
applied a "Peruvian solution" which, although defining a clearcut
position, has brought into sharp relief some of the most complex
aspects of the case, which many had hoped to avoid through a
negotiated settlement.
On October 9, 1968, less than one week after it deposed the
constitutional regime of President Fernando Belai'nde Terry, the
Revolutionary Government sent troops to take possession of the
La Brea y Pafifias oilfields and the Talara industrial complex
held and operated by IPC up to that time. The action was
characterized as the initiation of a constitutional expropriation of
private property for public purposes, save with respect to the
subsoil petroleum deposits, the taking of which was carried out as
revindication; or recovery by the rightful owner of property held
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by another. The more important subsequent developments in the
Peru-IPC case proceed directly from the October 9, 1968, actions
of the revolutionary Government and are consequent upon the
legal nature of the earlier action.
Perhaps the most important element in the government's case
is the reivindicaci6nof the subsoil petroleum deposit. The essence
of the reivindicaci6naction is that the government claims a right
to recuperate the oil reserves as they existed in 1924. For the part
of those reserves which was extracted and cannot be replaced, the
government asks $690,524,283 as restitution. As a direct consequence of the claim for restitution against it, IPC so far has
received no money compensation for its expropriated property.
The Peruvian government recognizes its constitutional duty to
pay fair value for all of IPC's assets which it expropriates, and
even carried out an evaluation of the La Brea y Paifiasinstallations and issued a check in IPG's favor for the determined amount,
about $70 million. 2 However, simultaneously with its issue, the
check was embargoed to be charged against the $690.5 million
restitution claim. All future evaluation and payment probably
will go through a similar process. Since its property in Peru has
never reached $690.5 million by anyone's estimate, IPC conceivably would never receive any compensation for the property it
has lostY
Throughout its handling of the controversy with IPC the
Revolutionary Government has been adamant in two respects:
first, that the matter is one controlled exclusively by the internal
laws of Peru and, secondly, that the matter is being conducted in
strict adherence to those laws. Thus, all remedies open to a
private party under Peruvian domestic law are available to IPC
insofar as they may apply to the instant circumstances. These
propositions will serve as the point of departure for this short
investigation. I propose to trace what domestic law has been
applied thus far and to demonstrate as completely as possible
how IPC has fared at the hands of Peruvian justice and why.
Since the Revolutionary Government took La Brea y Parilhasin
2 The payment was made in soles, the Peruvian currency, in the amount of
S/.2,748,292,653.37.
3
In interviews with the author in October, 1969, Petro-Peru Lawyers
indicated that the rest of International Petroleum Co.'s [hereinafter cited as IPC]
property had been tentatively valued at about $100 million.
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October, 1968, IPC has instituted two major appeals: (1) in the
Peruvian courts, attacking the constitutionality of the method of
expropriation of IPC's northern installations and the cancellation
of an agreement signed by the oil company and government represented as "the complete and definite solution of the matters
pending in the La Brea y Fariihasaffair," dated August 12, 1968;
and (2) in the Ministry of Energy and Mines, an administrative
appeal against the declared debt of $690,524,283 for restitution
of the La Brea y Fariiiasoil deposit of 1924 to the State. There
were in addition several potential remedies under Peruvian law
which IPC did not pursue. These will be developed briefly,
following discussion of the two actions already instituted.
I. MISE EN SCENE: RECENT LEGAL EVENTS LEADiNG up TO
OCTOBER,

1968"

IPC began its operations as owner of La Brea y Pariiiasin
May, 1924,' under the terms of an international award establishing
4 A number of publications deal with the La Brea y Parifiascontroversy. Esso
Inter-America has published three volumes of English translations of the primary
sources.

ThE LA BFA Y PABNAs CoNTROVEsy (1969)

[hereinafter cited as

CoNTRoVERSy]. Selections from these materials have appeared in 7 IN'r LEGAL MA-

TmIAIs 1201 (1968) and 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERUAjS 264 (1969). Under IPO's
auspices, the following books were published: EcHEcoP A,
INForm Juimico
SOBRIE EL CASO DE LA BREA Y PAn NAs (1960); ELEJALDE et al., LAuno AnBrrAL
DE LA BrA Y PARINAS (1963); ELEJALDE et al, LA BREA Y PAuJAs: EXA.N=
Junmico DE LOS PROYEcTOS DE LEY PRESENTADOS EN EL PA RLAENTO (1963); LONDON & PAcIFIc PsmoLEum Co., HIsToBiA DE LA BREA Y PAnrAs (2d ed. 1960);
OsoRss et al., LA BFxA Y PAusws: Discunsos ANTE EL SEN, o (LEsI.LgATuA

ExMAORmDIArA DE 1917) Y DicAr
NES JIrnicos (1963). Other publications
relating to the case include Zum mimAN, LA I-sTroA SECRETA DEL PETOLEO
(1968). Castafieda a series of five studies for a Senate Special Commission
charged with "studying and giving an opinion over all matters concerning the
La Brea y Parifias question," as follows: Andlisis del laudo que pretendid poner
tdrmino a la controversia sobre 'La Brea y Pariias',8 REVISTA DE DEREcno Y
CENcr S Po~rrcAs 5 (1964); La anticonstituicionlidadde la Ley No. 3016, y
la cuestion de 'La Brea y Parijias' 22 BEVISTA DE JuISPRUDENCIA PERuANA 364
(1964); La doctrina del registro de ia propiedadinmueble: La revisi6n internacional
ordenada por Ley, 22 REVISTA DE JURIsPRUDENcrA PERuANA 871 (1964); La prescripci6n en la consolidaci6n del dominio sobre 'La Brea y Pariflas' no ha functionado, 21 REVISTA DE JURISPRUDENCIA PERUANA 1574 (1963); and Aaialists del
dercho de propiedad sobre "La Brea y Parias'50 REVr=TA DEL Fono 1 (1963);
Goodwin, Letter from Peru, NEw YoRKER 41 (May 17, 1969); Z~rate, Polo, Impugna idn a is Tesis de la International Petroleum Company sobre la propiedad
absoluta
quue15 BEV¢ISTA
tribuye,DE
delJU'RISPtrJDENcIA
subsuelo y do losPERUANA
yacimientos
la Brea
y Parifias',
458, petroliferos
482 (1960.de This
list
is not exhaustive; Peruvian law reviews and journals over the last decade have
included a number of articles related to the controversy, and several other books
on it5have
been published
Peru.the operation from London &Pacifi
However,
IPC had in
leased
in 1914,
and in 1916 agreed to buy the property when a satisfactory settlement of its status
could be reached with the Peruvian government.
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a special 50-year tax regime for the exploitation of its subsurface
petroleum deposits.6
There is substantial disagreement as to whether the arbitration award purported to or actually did decide the question of
ownership of the subsoil rights to La Brea y Parilias. Although
that question was a central issue set out in the Agreement for
Arbitration, a second key issue was the physical expanse of the
property. The first article of the Agreement of Settlement, adopted
as the final arbitration award, "recognizes that the property 'La
Brea y Parifias' . . . which embraces both the surface and the
subsoil or mineralized zone, comprises 41,614 claims of 40,000
square meters each. .. ." A second article recognizes private
parties as "owners and users, respectively, of 'La Brea y Pariflas'
...
," but imposes substantial annual payments "by the way of
tax based on surface, tax on production, royalties and all other
contributions and taxes" on the oil-extracting operation.'
Since the arbitration tribunal never developed substantive
discussion of any issues, but simply adopted the provisions the
parties agreed upon, we are not much aided in interpreting the
award. Indeed, it may have been left purposely vague. Article I
can mean either that both surface and subsurface are owned, or
simply that the expanse of the surface coincides with that part
of the subsurface subject to mineral extraction, or both. Article
II establishes an advantageous tax regime, but does so by way of
all taxes a concessionaire would normally pay for subsurface
rights. In any case, the dispositions of the Arbitration Award
gave IPC rights which, to the extent they were valid, were unique
within the scheme of Peruvian petroleum operations.
Although the validity of the award and IPC's special rights
in its La Brea y Parifiasoperation became the objects of increasing concern on the part of Peruvian politicians and journalists,
and later of the people in general,8 no concrete action was taken
6The La Brea y Parifias tax regime was unique in that IPO d' not pay the
same canon, or concession tax, as ordinary concessionaires. It did pay full export
taxes and the normal income tax on domestic distribution of its petroleum products.
7 All passages from the Arbitration Award appear in 1 CoNmovmisy, Doc.
No. 2.
8 Particularly in the late 1950's, following an increase in gasoline prices and
a devaluation, several efforts were made to change the unique status of La Brec y
Parifias. IPC itself proposed to give up all its claims to the subsoil in return for
inclusion as a regular concession under law No. 11780, the Petroleum Code of
(Continued on next page)
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to change IPC's basic situation until President Belaimde took
office in July, 1963. As one of his major campaign promises,
Bela-6nde had declared he would submit a final resolution of
the problem to Congress within ninety days of his becoming
president. Although Bela 6nde kept his promise, the legislature
took no immediate action on his bill. Instead, it passed two laws
invalidating the 1922 arbitration award and repealing the 1918
law which had authorized submission of the controversy (as it

was then) to the arbitration process." The 41-year-old award
was unilaterally declared null ipso jure and not binding in any
way on the Peruvian state.
Negotiations between IPC and the Peruvian Executive to arrive at an amicable settlement were initiated, but no substantive
solutions were rapidly forthcoming. As matters dragged on for
almost four years without resolution, a Congress which was not
entirely antagonistic to IPC's interests responded to political
pressures and began to prod the Executive through legislation.1 °
A. Law No. 16674 of 1967
The law most plainly drafted to pressure the Executive, and
the one which laid down in broad terms the steps which have
been taken by the military junta, was Law No. 16674 of July 26,
1967. That act declared that La Brea y Parihashad been recovered by the nullification of the 1922 award and was state property,
directed the Executive to register the oilfields as a national reserve
area (superseding any other registration for the same property),
and finally commanded the Executive to establish for La Brea y
Parifias'exploitation "the regime most consistent with the national
interest, adopting any of those [included in article 62 of Petroleum Law No. 11780 of 1952 for incorporating prior existing
enterprises into the new scheme of concessions] or some other
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

1952. See petition of IPC to Director of Petroleum, August 9, 1957, (both in 1
CoNTrovmasy, Doc. No. 3). Shortly thereafter a number of bills, most of them
hostile to IPC's interests, were introduced in Congress. None was enacted at that
time. However the bills provide for virtually all of the action the Revolutionary
Government followed in 1968 and 1969. See discussion of each bill in ELEjALDnE et
1952. See petition of IPC to Director of Petroleum, August 9, 1957, in 1
EN EL PARLAMENTO (1963).

9 Laws No. 14695 and No. 14696, Nov. 6, 1963.
10 Law No. 14863, Feb. 12, 1964; Law No. 15252, Nov. 18, 1964; Lav No.

16674, July 16, 1967; Project of Law, Nov. 1966, in J.CoNTovmSY, Dec. No. 12.
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more favorable to the country." The same law expressly authorized the Executive to expropriate "equipment, installations, and
assets in general" to the extent necessary to give the State a complete petroleum mining, processing, and distributing operation.
Any such expropriation was to be consistent with the Constitution,
"taking into account... IPC's debts to the State.""
The Belaiinde government, while it continued negotiations
with IPC, began to honor the law's mandate. The La Brea y
Parifias property was inscribed in the name of the State, IPC's
title registration being canceled.' 2 Government ministries began
feasibility studies to determine what scheme of exploitation for
La Brea y Pariihas would be most beneficial to the State.3 A
fiscal tribunal set guidelines for fixing IPC's debts under an unjust
enrichment provision of the Civil Code 4 and the debt was thereafter tentatively established at $144,015,582.22, representing all
profits on IPC's operations at La Brea y Parifasfor fifteen years,
less taxes paid to the State during that time. 5 The Attorney General of Peru was authorized to take the proper steps to collect
that debt, 6 as well as any other actions "necessary to insure
restitution to the State of the value of the product extracted" by
IPC from the La Brea y Parifiasdeposits.' Taken with language
in Law No. 16674 which employed the term revindication, such
an authorization becomes a harbinger of the $690.5 million debt
claimed against IPC today.
Shortly after the promulgation of Law No. 16674, IPC received express permission to continue its operations as before,
but under provisional status and without prejudice to the government's final dispositions under the law.' 8 In the meantime,
IPC perfected the record by filing a series of appeals and exceptions to the Executive's actions in applying Law No. 16674.'9
Outwardly, nothing had changed, but legally an extensive and
11 All quotations from Law No. 16674 of July 26, 1967, art. 3.
12

S.D. No. 61-F of July 31, 1967, art. 1.

13 Id., art. 2.

14See Oficio No. 157 of Nov. 2, 1967 (1 CorTRovEnsy, Doc. No. 24), issued
under authority of S.D. No. 216-H of Aug. 25, 1967.
1'Official Communique of Nov. 17, 1967 (1 CoNmovmsy, Doc. No. 29).

'6S.R. No. 1069-H of Nov. 10, 1967.
'7 S.R. No. 1240-H of Dec. 16, 1967.
18 See S.D. No. 61-F of July 31, 1967, art. 3; Directorial Resolution [hereinafter cited as D.R.] of Aug. 10, 1967.
19 See 1 Com-ovEasY, Docs. No. 15, No. 18, No. 19, No. 22, No. 27, No. 33,
No. 34, No. 36, No. 40, No. 41, No. 42, No. 44. No. 47.
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complicated process was well under way before the end of 1967.
Of course, Law No. 16674 did not bar other solutions to the La
Brea y Parinasaffair and negotiations toward a friendly settlement
continued,2 but the Peruvian Executive's application of Law No.
16674 was clearly moving toward a unilateral resolution on La
Brea y Parifiaswhich IPC could only consider prejudicial to its
legal rights.
B. The August, 1968, Agreement
If the actions initiated under the aegis of Law No. 16674
were meant to pressure IPC at the bargaining table they may
have had their desired effect, for after breaking down completely
for a time in early 1968, negotiations began to move rapidly
toward accord. 21 In his state-of-the-republic address on July 28,
1968, President Belainde announced that IPC and the government were in substantial agreement on the terms of a settlement
in the La Brea y Parifas case. This agreement was written into
a contract signed by IPC and the Peruvian Government, registered
before a Lima notary on August 14, 1968. Empresa Petrolera
Fiscal (hereinafter referred to as EPF), predecessor to PetroPerd, signed two additional contracts with IPC concerning the
sale by EPF to IPC of crude oil and natural gas produced in La
Brea y Parifias.
The main contract stipulated that IPC recognized the Peruvian
State's eminent domain, renounced all potential claims to the
La Brea y Panifas subsoil, and transferred to the State all IPC
rights in the surface, including those installations used in the
extracting process. The refinery and related installations were
to be retained by IPC, which under the contracts signed with
EPF would have purchased up to 80% of EPF's production of
crude oil and all of the natural gas from La Brea y Parifas. The
State also agreed to cancel all money claims it may have had
against IPC as a result of its administration of La Brea y Pariiias
field since 1924, and to guarantee IPC's existing and future concessions in other parts of Peru. The parties declared that the
20 See Law No. 16674 of July 26, 1967, art. 3.

21 See communication of
CoNmroVERsY, Doc. No. 34);

IPC to Minister of Development, 12 January 1968 (1
Goodwin, Letter from Peru, NEw YouxaE 41, 72-80
(May 17, 1969); 1 CoNmrovERsY 33-35; 2 CoNTRovEmsY 1-5.
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agreement had "totally and definitively resolved" all matters
pending in the La Brea y Pariiiascontroversy.22
Final resolution of the matter was not so easily achieved, however. The Executive had negotiated the agreement not only under
authorization of Law No. 16674, but also under a very general
delegation of powers for a 60-day period during which the
Executive was empowered by law to "prescribe extraordinary
measures to, inter alia, promote the complete development of the
economy."2 3 In each case of specific Executive action under the
delegatory law, Law No. 17044, account was to be rendered to
Congress after the fact, so that the legislature could then-consistent with Peruvian practice-debate the measure and, if it
desired, exercise a veto.24 No express approval by Congress was
necessary, since Law No. 17044 required none. However, although
a "final" agreement had been signed, the Peruvian State arguably
was not fully bound until the agreement was approved-either
specifically or tacitly-in Congress. In the meantime, the Executive began to implement the terms of the contract through a series
of administrative decrees and resolutions.25
Amid increasingly critical popular comment on the settlement,
Congress had not approved the contract when it adjourned on
September 6, 1968. Objections and protest were further heightened when the president of EPF resigned and then went on
national television to denounce as invalid the contract with IPC
for the purchase of crude oil from La Brea y Parifias claiming a
crucial eleventh and final page had been signed but deleted from
the version ultimately made public.2 6
On October 3, 1968, a military junta deposed President
22

7 Iur'r

The main contract is published in 2
LEGAL. MATERILuS

CoNTRovERsy,

Doc. No. 51 and also in

1217 (1968); the crude-oil contract in

2 CoNTovERSY,

Doc. No. 55 and also in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATIALS 1281 (1968); the natural-gas
contract
23 in 2 CoNTRovERsY, Doc. No. 57, 7 INT'L LEGAL MATmIAs 1226 (1968).
Law No. 17044 of June 20, 1968.
24 See Furnish, The Hierarchy of Peruvian Laws, - Am. J. CoNw. L. (1971).
25
See 2 CoNTaov
ysY,
Does. No. 52-57, including S.D. No. 088-68-FO of
August 13, 1968; S.R. No. 0020-68-FO-PE, and S.R. No. 0020-68-FO-PE, all of
August2 14, 1968. See also 7 INTL LEGAL MATEwAL 1226-44 (1968).
OWhether in fact the page in question ever existed or, if it did, what may
have happened to it, seems impossible to determine with any degree of reliability.
Perhaps the most plausible explanation of the famous "missing eleventh page" is
that of Goodwin, supra note 21, at 80-86, but it does not explain what happened
to the page.
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Beladnde and took control of the government. As its first official
act it promulgated Decree-Law No. 17063, the Statute of the
Revolutionary Government. The first article of this brief charter
of the de facto administration hinted that one of the primary
reasons for its assumption of power was the junta's dissatisfaction
with the settlement in the La Brea y Pariihascase.17 In its substantive provisions, the Statute of the Revolutionary Government
established that a junta of the commanding Generals of the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force should designate a President, 8
who would exercise all the functions ascribed to the chief executive under the Constitution plus, with the approving vote of his
Cabinet, all those powers assigned by the Constitution to the
legislature. 9 The Revolutionary Government pledged itself to
act in conformity with the Constitution and other laws of the
State "insofar as they may be compatible with the objectives of
the Revolutionary Government." 0
C. The Revolutionary Government and IPC
The de facto government turned immediately to the La Brea
y Parifias issue. Decree-Law No. 17065 of October 4, 1968 annulled the settlement contract with IPC and all other acts and
obligations of the State undertaken in consideration of it. On
October 9, 1968, Decree-Law No. 17066 declared the expropriation of the Talara industrial complex, proceeding on the assumption that reivindicaci6nof the subsurface oil deposits had already
been initiated. The government invoked the Constitution and
Law No. 16674 as the bases for the expropriation, which commenced the same day when troops were sent to Talara to take
possession from IPC.
When EPF assumed the administration of the La Brea y
Pariflas field and refineries, an ad hoc arrangement was made
under which IPC took the production of the field from the
27 "The Armed Forces of Peru, duly ...
conscious of the immediate necessity
of putting an end to . . . the surrender of natural resources of wealth . . . as well
as to the loss of the principle of sovereignty . . . assume responsibility for the
direction of the State, for the purpose of moving it ahead toward the definitive
achievement of national objectives."
28 Decree-Law [hereinafter cited as D.L.] No. 17063, Oct. 4, 1968, art. 4.
29 Id., art. 6.
3o Id., art. 5.
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refinery and retailed it through the IPC distribution network.

The crude production of the contiguous "Lima" concession, which
remained in IPC's possession, also continued to be processed
through the Talara refinery.
No wholesale price for the petroleum products was fixed at
the beginning of the period. The parties were supposed to settle
their differences by accord shortly thereafter, but when EPF sent
IPC an invoice for $11.7 million in petroleum products delivered
up to December 31, 1968, IPC protested that payment would

have meant operating its retail network at a loss and that no
special account had been made for crude oil delivered from IPC's
"Lima" concession to the Talara refinery for processing.1
The government attempted to freeze IPC's accounts to coerce
payment, as had been done successfully earlier on a tax claim, 2
but discovered that IPC had run its Peruvian bank accounts into
the red while repatriating $14 million at the favorable certificate
rate of exchange between January and October 1968. The
repatriations paid back dollar loans from United States banks for
IPC equipment purchases, and further repatriations on the same
loans were authorized on November 5, 1968, by the Revolutionary Government's Minister of Finance.3 IPC's exchange
operations were unquestionably legal, but the fact that they had
been permitted cost a Minister of Finance and several high
officials in the Central Reserve Bank their jobs.
Closely following this episode, the Peruvian government announced on February 6, 1969, that IPC owed it $690,524,283 in
restitution for all of the mineral products it had removed from
La Brea y Parifias since May, 1924.11 As security against the
$690.5 million and other debts, EPF physically and legally moved
in as trustee of all of IPC's Peruvian operation." Following the
process to its logical termination, on August 22, 1969, the gov1
U
See 2 CoNmhovEnsY at 27-30; Comisidn Encargada de Fijar Responsibilidades en Control y Administracidn de los Bienes de la IPC, IrFomm 20-30
(Lima, 1969).
32 See S.R. No. 1070-H, Nov. 10, 1967; Official Communique of Ministry of
Finance, Nov. 29, 1967, in 1 CoNTovEnsy, Doc. No. 31.
33These events are detailed in Comisidn Encargada de Filar Responsibilidades
en Control
y Administracidn de los Bienes de la IPC, IN~oMu 5-19 (Lima, 1969).
34
Ministerial Resolution [hereinafter cited as M.R.] No. 0017-69-FO/PE,
Feb. 35
5, 1969.
Notice of Preventive Embargo of Feb. 6, 1968, 2 Co ,maovzmsY, Doc. No. 80.
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eminent moved to expropriate the "totality of [IPC's] economic
activities." 6

1I. IPC's

HABEAS

ComRus APPEA.L

Less than a week after the military government took possession
of La Brea y Paiifas and its installations, IPC filed a petition in
the Superior Court of Lima, Fifth Correctional Tribunal, attacking the constitutionality of the two decree-laws under which
the Revolutionary Government had acted.37 IPC's petition was
submitted as an "appeal of habeas corpus."
Habeas corpus is a very broad remedy in Peru, having evolved
beyond the more limited application of the remedy of the same
name in the Common Law jurisdictions from which it was
originally adapted to the Peruvian system. Under the present
Peruvian Constitution and laws, 8 habeas corpus has become
a general summary action available to any natural or juridical
person as a means of impugning any official action which may
infringe his "individual and social" constitutional rights.3 9 The
action is sometimes characterized as an appeal because it is
initiated at the first appellate level in the court system and is
limited to issues of constitutional law.4
IPC's habeas corpus petition specifically attacked the constitutionality of Decree-Laws No. 17065 and No. 17066 and all
official acts dependant on them. Against the first decree-law,
IPC's major argument was that under article 220 of the Constitution only the judicial branch legitimately could annul the La
Brea y Parifas settlement agreements between IPC and the
deposed constitutional regime. Article 220 vests the power of
administering justice in the courts, and IPC contended that the
military Executive had usurped that power by promulgating a
36 S.D. No. 014-EM/DGll, Aug. 22, 1969, preamble. However, because of
IPC's debit accounts all money and credits in favor of or against l1'C were excluded
from the expropriation. See id.
37 Expediente [hereinafter cited as Exp.] No. 969/68, Oct. 14, 1968; English
translation in 2 CoNRmovw.sy, Doe. No. 67.
38 CONST. art. 69; CODE OF CUMMAL PROCEDURE, §§ 349-59; OtGAmc LAw
OF J :ic.L PowER, § 141 (7).

39 See, e.g., Bustamante Cisneros, Constituci6n y Habeas Corpus, 18 REv. DE
JURISPRUDENCIA PERUANA 244 (1960); Cooper, Habeas Corpus in the Peruvian
Legal System, 30 REv. DE DEBECHo Y CENCIus PoLrnCAS 297 (1967); Ferrero,
Garantids
Constitucionales,27 DERscno 35, 36-37 (1969).
40
See Cooper, supra note 39, at 328-32.
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law invalidating a contract and other juridical acts in consideration of it. Supporting reference was made to article 19 ("Those
acts are null which usurp public function .... ") and to article 228
...

terminated processes may not be revived.")

Decree-Law No. 17066, under which the government had
taken immediate possession of IPC's surface rights and improvements in La Brea y Panifas,was impugned as a violation of private property rights guaranteed under: (1) article 29 provisions
against expropriation without prior judicial process and indemnification; (2) the freedom-of-commerce-and-industry clause of
article 40; and (3) the prohibitions against confiscation of private
property in articles 29 and 57.
On the above grounds, IPC asked that the decree-laws in
question should be found inapplicable and that the violation of
its constitutional rights should be terminated by restoring matters
to their status prior to the promulgation of the decree-laws. The
habeas corpus was found inadmissible by the Fifth Correctional
Tribunal,41 and that decision was upheld on appeal to the
Supreme Court, 42 one judge in five dissenting.

In initiating its habeas corpus action IPC may have been
attempting to follow the successful example of another Peruvian
oil company, Conchan Chevron. A short time before, on August
3, 1968, Conchan Chevron had received a favorable verdict from
the Fourth Correctional Tribunal of Lima in an habeas corpus
action against three supreme decrees of the Belauinde government
which attempted to create special privileges for the state oil
company, EPF, by discriminating against the operations of
Conchan and others holding long-term concessions.4 Eveo
though it cited one of the same constitutional provisions,
IPC's habeas corpus was quite different in substance. The issue
in IPC's action was not discrimination. Rather possession of
property, expropriation procedures, and the annulment of an
agreement on petroleum rights were at issue, and the official
dispositions under attack were decree-laws of a de facto government rather than supreme decrees.
41Exp.
No. 969/68, R.S., Nov. 9, 1968 (Trib. Corr., 5a. Sala).
42
Exp. No. 939/68, R.S., Jan. 3, 1969 (Corte Suprema, la. Sala) (4-1 vote).
43
Exp. No. 1278/67, R.S. Aug. 3, 1968 (Trib. Corr., 4a. Sala). Conchan
Chevron relied primarily on article 23 (equality of persons before the law) and
article 40 (freedom of commerce) of the Constitution.
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In rejecting IPC's habeas corpus, the Fifth Correctional Tribunal floundered into the momentous question of what limits
exist on the powers of a de facto government in Peru and, more
specifically, on that government's handling of a cause celebre
such as the La Brea y Parifiascontroversy. Read at the temporal
distance of over two years from the agitated political atmosphere in which the case was submitted, argued and decided,
the Fifth Correctional Tribunal's opinion is easily criticized. It
is a decision unusually prolix and intemperate for a Peruvian
court.44 Ignoring the possibility that the Revolutionary Government's decree-laws might be valid under the Constitution, the
Correctional Tribunal addressed itself to the broad question of
whether those substantive parts of the Peruvian legal system,
which may provide for judicial preference of the Constitution
over conflicting laws or other official acts, applied to DecreeLaws No. 17065 and No. 17066. Thus posed, as the unique issue
in a decision upholding the validity of the decree-laws in question, the problem can be resolved only by subverting the written
constitution or by a non sequitur.
The Fifth Correctional Tribunal appeared to attempt both.
The court found that although a number of provisions of Peruvian
law seem to command an unequivocal preference for the Con45
stitution over any other official disposition in a conflict of norms,
to accept IPC's habeas corpus action would have been to accept
the thesis that "judicially and by resolution issued by a correctional tribunal, the decree-laws in question might be modified
or repealed in whole or in part." Although the second proposition
should follow quite logically from the first, the appellate court
44

Sample passage:

La Empresa ha disfrutado por much tiempo de un r6gimen de
privilegio, incompatible con los derechos y la dignidad nacionales,
ilegando a establecer un verdadero monopolio inconstitucional e intolerable; r6gimen que en otra forma, trat6 de prorrogar en los contratos de
agosto y septiembre iltimo, cuando se sacudi6 de los costosos trabajos
de extracci6n de petroleo, consigui6 la condonaci6n de fabulosos adeudados
al Fisco, obtuvo recien concesiones y logr6 que, de todos modos, a A'tulo
de comprador monop6lico, quedarA en sus manos los productos de la
extracei6n, a cambio de renunciar a la mayor parte de la superficie de La
Brea y Parifias y de que liricamente pudiera decantarse, que esta hacienda,
volvA al seno de la Patria....
45 See CrVIL CODE, PRELIMINARY Trn.,

art. XXII; ORGANIC LAw OF JuDICLkL
PowvR, D.L. No. 14605 July 25, 1963, arts. 7-8; Furnish, Hierarchy of Peruvian
Laws, - Am. J. CoM. L. -

(1971).
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found it untenable and pronounced IPC's habeas corpus petition
inadmissible on that basis.
The lower court's opinion contained another, more subjective
element which may have been of greater importance to the final
result. Throughout the rambling language of the decision there
appear references to the possibility that a de facto government
may do no constitutional wrong so long as it acts "with true
nationalistic meaning," "in the full exercise of national sovereignty," and "in adherence to the unanimous desire of the people."
Whether these and similar criteria all inhered in the Revolutionary Government's action on La Brea y Parifiasremains a problematical point, but the court's references to an ad hoe constitutionality should not be brushed aside as lightly as one might
be tempted to do on first reading. They describe a legitimacy
gained not through adherence to specific provisions of a written
constitution but through respect for the constituent attitude-on
a given issue-of the parties to the social contract. The detection
and determination of such a constituent objective in addition to
or in exception to those set out in the Constitution would seem
a dangerous task for a court to accept, but it may be significant
in this context that on two occasions since the rejection of IPC's
habeas corpus petition, the Fourth Correctional Tribunal has
upheld habeas corpus actions brought by journalists who were
summarily expelled from Peru for their criticism of the military
government.40 In those cases, constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press47 and of an individuals right of residence 48 were
valued above the objectives of the Revolutionary Government. 49
Thus, the courts may be disposed to withhold their approbation
whenever the de facto government violates the Constitution in
absence of constituent license. On the other hand, this may be
an unwarranted interpretation of the Correctional Tribunals in4
OExp. 1342/68, R.S., April 28, 1969 (Trib. Corr., 4a. Sala); Exp. 1298/69.
R.S., 47April 19, 1969 (Trib. Corr., 4a. Sala).
CONST. art. 63.
48id.
art. 68.
4
) The Revolutionary Government did not immediately respect the court's
holdings, however. The reported comment of the Minister of Government was,
"May they return then, if they can." (Que vuelvan, si pueden). However, in
February, 1970, the same minister stated all political exiles could return at will,
that he had never meant to threaten or exclude any of them. See EL COMMRCIO,
February 12 and 13, 1970, at 4.
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dependence. In the cases of the deported journalists, the only
member of the Executive Cabinet directly involved was the Minister of Government, who did not receive public support for his
action from either the President or his Cabinet.
In ruling on IPC's appeal from the adverse holding in the
lower court, the Supreme Court majority wrote a typically short,
unelaborated opinion which did not develop or expose the high
court's reasoning. Such substantive discussion as it contains accounts for less than half of a 344-word opinion. The Supreme
Court noted that Decree-Law No. 17065 and No. 17066 had been
promulgated "in accordance" with earlier laws of Congress 0 and
according to procedures fixed by the Statute of the Revolutionan
Government, Decree-Law No. 17063. Without further elaboration, the decision stated that, "[lit is not required for the exercise
of a right by its natural owner, that a prior judicial declaration
should be pronounced concerning it, since its existence, based

on a law, is superior and precedent to any judicial decision and
requires none to preserve it intact."5 '
Taken as a general proposition, the court's language might
express the antithesis of the rule of law, i.e., under this rule any
party could unilaterally impose whatever he considered to be his

"natural rights," secure in the belief that they were "superior and
precedent to any judicial decision." However, Peruvian courts
do not operate on the principle of stare decisis. The ratio decidendi in a given case is not necessarily expected to stand as a
precedent or to be consistent with the past cases.5 2 Supreme
Court opinions often offer neither a detailed discussion of the
sources relied on nor a careful exposition of the way in which
its announced propositions lead to the result. Thus, the Peruvian
high court, even in its most important decisions, writes almost
as an oracle, in the sense that its ruling is apt to be brief and
5o Specifically, Laws No. 9125, June 4, 1940; No. 14696, Nov. 5, 1963; No.
16674, July 16, 1967; and No. 17044, June 10, 1968.
51
In te original:
..el titular de un derecho no requiere pam su. ejercicio que, previsinente,
una declaraci6n judicial se pronuncie sobre el, ya que su existencia, basada
en la ley, es superior y anterior a toda decision judicial pov lo que no
requiere dejaano a salvo. -.
Note that "titular" might also be translated "title holder," rather than "natural
owner," as the author has done here.
52 See Furnish, supra note 45.

1970]

PsauvmN Domms-c LAw

cryptic. 53 Elaborating where the court did not may seem to be
a fruitless exercise, but it presents the only possibility of deriving
meaning which would fit a vague statement to a specific result.
IPC's argument that the military government lacked the
constitutional power to nullify IPC's August 12, 1968, agreement
with the deposed Executive is based on the supposition that both
parties had completed all the formalities necessary to bind themselves. However, the Executive had acted under the special 60day delegation of powers in Law No. 17044 when it negotiated
and accepted the agreement. 54 Under that law, the Executive
was required to "give account" to Congress of its special actions.
Thus, the constitutional legislature may have had a right-still
unexercised at the time of the military coup-to consider the
Executive's "final solution" to the La Brea y Parifasproblem and
reject it. 55 According to its basic statute and the recognized
practice of military governments in Latin America, the Revolutionary Government has the legislative prerogative, which it exercises through the President and his Cabinet.5 6 Arguably then,
Decree-Law No. 17065 did no more than apply the legislative
prerogative specifically reserved in Law No. 17044: the right to
review and reject Executive action based upon that law.
Other of IPC's constitutional arguments simply appear untenable under the clear terms of the Constitution itself. Recent
amendments to article 29, which provide for compensation in
long-term bonds or by other manner of deferred payment "which
the law shall establish," where expropriation of sources of energy
is involved, would seem to give the government a right to possession prior to compensation.5 7 Freedom of commerce and industry, as guaranteed in article 40 and upheld in the Conchan
Chevron habeas corpus, would appear to be no bar to exercise
of the State's right of eminent domain through proper expropriation proceedings.
No such ready explanation exists for the Revolutionary Gov53
In its ruling on IPG's habeas corpus, the majority opinion used 344 words,
less than half of which were substantive discussion.
54As recognized in S.D. No. 080-68-FO, Aug. 9, 1968, authorizing signature
of the contract, and in the contract of Aug. 12 1968, as well.
55 See Furnish, supra note 45 at n. 12 and accompanying text,
567 Id., authority cited n. 10.
1L;w v No, 15252 Nov. 18, 1964, art. 1,
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ernment's possession of the La Brea y Parifiasfield and installations as the first step in an expropriation proceeding. Article 29

of the Constitution states that no one shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law, a provision which quite
clearly appears to have been violated. Although the seizure was
justified in the preamble to Decree-Law No. 17066 "to ensure
the administrative collection of IPC's outstanding debts," and
although Law No. 16674 authorized the Executive to expropriate
La Brea y Pariflas "taking into account... IPC's debts to the

State," under normal circumstances such dispositions would not
appear to be capable of mitigating the constitutional prerequisite
of judicial process before the State may take possession of property
it wishes to expropriate. 58
Perhaps the Supreme Court's holding is consistent with that
part of the Fifth Correctional Tribunars opinion which can be
interpreted to mean that the Revolutionary Government enjoyed
a constituent license (a right) to depart from constitutional
procedures in its expropriation of the La Brea y Pariflas surface
property. Perhaps the Supreme Court's ambiguous opinion goes
even further, holding that so long as the Revolutionary Government acts through decree-laws (the right to govern according
to its Statute, Decree-Law No. 17063) the court will not presume
to review its action.5 9 The latter might be more plausible in the
light of Latin American custom and practice with de facto governments. 0 Further, the Peruvian Supreme Court has never held
a law of Congress or a decree-law unconstitutional.0 '
58 The government was probably afraid that if it did not take immediate
possession of the industrial complex, it would have been left in the hands of a
party faced with a large debt and possibly resentful of the government's action,
thus not disposed to play the role of faithful trustee of a vital industrial resource.
See address by Garcia Montfar, legal advisor to the Ministry of Energy and Mines,
Expropiaci6n do PropiedadExtraniera,Protecci6n Diplomdtica y No Intervencd',
presented to the Lima Bar Ass'n, Jan. 9, 1969. This is not of course a constitutional
justification, but a similar process was employed recently when large coastal
sugar plantations were occupied by government administrators the day after it
was announced they would be expropriated, probably for similar reasons. See D.L.
17716, June 24, 1969, art. 61.
59 The Dictamen Fiscal, or recommendation of the Supreme Court's independent counsel, seemed to urge that construction. See Exp. 939/68, Dictamen
Fiscal, Dec. 13, 1968 (Corte Suprema, la. Sala).
60 This would be in keeping with the theory that any successful revolution
brings with it a "destruction of the country's constitutional substance, for .. .no
pre-revolutionary Constitution can claim validity in such circumstances; the basis
of its effectiveness, its grundnorm, has perished before a new, superior normcreating force." Cooper, supra note 39, at 306. See also Irizarry y Puente, The
(Continued on next page)
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A definitive interpretation is made more difficult because the
Supreme Court opinion is not only vague in its positive aspects,
but in addition a negative element is added. It approves only the
result of the Fifth Correctional Tribunal, disclaiming "the other
matters contained" in its decision as "irrelevant and untenable"
(insubsistente). Whether this refers to the intemperate and erroneous statements in the lower court's opinion, or to all or portions of its substantive discussion, is unclear. The dissent, as brief
and vague as the majority opinion, sheds no light on the matter.
In any event, such ruminations hold no comfort for IPC at this
juncture, for whether the Revolutionary Government had only
constituent approval of unique exceptions to the Constitution or
an unchecked power to violate the Constitution at will, it did
annul IPC's settlement agreement and possess its property unchecked by the written constitution or the judicial power.
III. TBE $690,524,283

DEBT CLAIm

AND IPC's

ADMmsTRATivE APPEAL

Perhaps the single most important aspect of the La Brea y
Parifascontroversy is the $690,524,283 debt the Peruvian government claims against IPC. It is this debt, and the legal basis upon
which it is claimed, that make the case unique.6 2 Because of the
debt, IPC may never collect any compensation for the investments taken from it by the Revolutionary Government: all
indemnification for expropriated property will simply be embargoed and charged off against the debt, which surpasses all
estimates of IPC's total assets in Peru prior to October, 1968.63
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Nature and Powers of a 'Defacto' Government in Latin America, 30 TuiL. L. REv.
15 (1955).
61
See Furnish, supra note 45.
62
In addition, the Peruvian government has declared that IPG owed an
additional amount of "more than $54,848,308.10" for compulsory investments it
did not make after 1959 and harmful production methods employed after relations
with the Peruvian government worsened. Informative Bulletin No. 18 of Ministry

of Energy and Mines of May 13, 1968, in 3 Coqmmovansy, Doc. No. 97.
Although other possible debts have been mentioned, and even reported (See
JOURNAL OF CoMMERCE, March 25 1969 at 10), at this time the Peruvian government makes specific claim for: (1) $690.5 million for restitution of La Brea y
Parifias petroleum deposits, (2) $54.8 million for obligatory investments avoided,
and (3) $9.2 million for products delivered by EPF to IPC between October 9,

1968 and January 20, 1969. This study concentrates on the first debt, as both IPC
and the Peruvian government have to date.
63 See D.L. No. 17517, March 21, 1969; notes 2-3 supra and accompanying
tex.
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Finally, most of the more difficult and central questions of law
in the case are met over the issue of the debt.
The $690.5 million debt represents restitution for all of the
minerals extracted from the La Brea y Pariflas field during the
period in which IPC claimed ownership, March 1, 1924, to
October 8, 1968.' Stated another way, the debt restores to the
Peruvian State the value it enjoyed in the La Brea y Parifias
subsoil petroleum deposit on March 1, 1924, which was subsequently lost through IPC's exploitation of the field. Accordingly,
the amount of the debt was determined by a relatively simple
method: production totals for crude oil, natural gas, and liquified
propane gas during the period in question were each multiplied
by a standard wholesale unit price minus freight and costs of
65
production.
Legally the debt forms an integral part of the Peruvian State's
reivindicaci6n of the La Brea y Parifias subsoil petroleum deposits. According to the classic definition, reivindicacidnrefers to
the right of an owner not in possession of his property to recover
it from a possessor who has no property right in it.66 The Peruvian government, claiming the right of reivindicacidnin the name
of the State, takes the position that "juridically the real property
constituted by a mine is the deposit of substances in solid, liquid
or gaseous state . . . a property which, by its peculiar nature,
disappears to the extent that it is the object of exploitation or
use." 67 Thus, consistent with the concept of reivindicacion and
the special depleting nature of petroleum deposits, the State may
claim not only direct possession of the mineral resources remaining in the La Brea y Parifiassubsoil, but also may require restitution for the part which has been removed. Good faith of the
64 M.R. No. 0017-69-FO PE, Feb. 6, 1969, preamble.
65 Id., appendix, in 2 CoNTovERsY, Doc. No. 79; 8 INT'L LEGAL MATErLUS
300-04 (1969). The prices utilized may be arbitrary- the East Texas price used
for crude oil is one of the highest in the world and relatively little of the La Brea
y Parinascrude was sold in the United States during IPC's administration. Further
the United States price has increased recently with respect to the international
market.
66
See, e.g., Cabanellas,3 DiccroNAluo DE DERECHo USUAL 527 (Buenos Aires,
1954). Replevin was a similar action at Common Law.
The Peruvian Civil Code does not include a lengthy provision for reivindicacicn as for example, the Chilean Code does. Compare Peruvian Code, art. 850,
with Chilean Code, arts. 889-915. Nonetheless, the institution is well known and,

in any case, the reivindicaci6n applied in the instant case is probably and ad hoe
action.
67 S.1. No, 0095-69-EM, Aug. 6, 1969, preamble,
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possessor is no defense to the obligation to make restitution where
depletion of the property has occurred. Reivindication involves
no question of use by the possessor; itsimply forces him to surrender all of the property to the owner, making reparation for
whatever part of the original property cannot be returned. Other
adjustments between owner and possessor are necessary, but the
essence of the action of reivindicaci6nis the recuperation by the
owner of his original property.
A. The Procedure
International Petroleum Co. was not notified of the $690.5
million debt until February 6, 1969, almost four months after the
Revolutionary Government forcefully occupied La Brea y Parifias.
Computation of the debt and official notification was by the Ministry of Development and Public Works, which was instructed
by Decree-Law No. 17066 to "commence and carry out the
process of expropriation" of the surface and installations of IPC's
La Brea y Pariflasproperty, taking into account "for the purposes
of compensation, the amount of IPC's debts to the State, whose
collection will be effected." Coincidentally with the notification
to IPC of the $690.5 million claim against it, a "preventive embargo in the form of intervention" was placed on all the remaining assets in Peru.6" In effect, the government took over IPC's
total operation, under a procedure for the "coactive" collection
of public debts established by Decree-Law No. 17855 of December 31, 1968.
As before, IPC was quick to attack the government's action.
Within two weeks the company filed an administrative appeal
against the ministerial resolution fixing the debt. 69 Unsuccessful
in the Ministry of Development and Public Works,70 where the
resolution originated, IPC renewed its appeal to the highest
administrative level, the President of the Republic, where it was
also rejected.7 1 Due to the restrictions on public debtors created
by Decree-Law No. 17355, IPC had no other means of attacking
68

Notice of Preventive Embargo,2 CoNTRovERsY, Doe. No. 80; 8 INu'L LEGAL
305 (1969).
69 IPC Appeal of Feb. 21, 1969, in 2 CoTRaovERsY, Doc. No. 81; 8 hnr'z

MATmuAs

LEGAL MATEurAls 316 (1969).

70 M.R. No.144-EM AT,July 8,1969.
71 S.R. No.095-EM,Aug. 6,1969.
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the debt; all judicial recourse was blocked until the entire claim
72
was paid to the Peruvian State.

B. IPC's Allegations
In essential part, IPC's petition before the Ministry of Development and Public Works states:
[We] have no debt whatever to the State for the value of the
products which we have extracted from La Brea y Pariias
from 1924 to October 9, 1968, inasmuch as such extraction was
done on the basis of our title as owners of said oifield ....
[Aissuming that our status of our title as owners of the La
Brea y Pariihasoilfields should not be recognized, it would still
be impossible to doubt our good faith possession ... Moreover, we point out that in the period of more than forty years
in which we have been possessors of the La Brea y Parifias
oilfields, such possession has been public, peaceful, consented
governments ... and has never been judicially
to by several
73
questioned.
In its brief and unembellished allegations, IPC tacitly presumes that the La Brea y Parifiascontroversy is controlled by the
provisions of the Peruvian Civil Code. If this is true, the case is a
simple one under the normal rules of Peruvian real property law
and IPC's legal position is remarkably strong. 74 However, since
long before the founding of the Peruvian Republic, mineral resources have been subject to a regime of special obligations and
72 1PC's appeal was under S.D. No. 006-SC, Nov. 11, 1957. The Regulations
of the General Norms of Administrative Procedures, Law No. 17355, Dec. 31
1968, art. 6, leave it to the discretion of the administrative agency involved
whether to suspend the administrative process and allow a judicial presentation of
issues. Such a restriction is in contravention of the general rule, which would
allow a court to take an issue from the Executive branch whenever a "litigious

question" is involved.

ORGAIc

OF JumciAL

Powa,

D.L. 14605, July 23,

1963, art. 10.
lPC petitioned the "coactive judge," the magistrate especially appointed to
handle the coercive collection procedures under law No. 17355, to permit a
judicial determination of various legal points involved in its debt to EPF for
delivery of retail oil products. IPC was unsuccessful both before the coactive
judge and on appeal to the Supreme Court. See IPC Petition of Feb. 25, 1969'
Denial by Coactive Judge, Feb. 27, 1969, in 2 CoNTmovEnsy, Docs. No. 83 and
No. 84; 8 INT'L LEGAL MATRaus 322, 326 (1969); IPC Appeal March 18, 1969Denial by Supreme Court, March 28, 1969, in 3 CoNmovsy, Does. No. 86 and
87.
73 IPC Appeal of April 22, 1969, against M.R. No. 0017-69-FO/PE, in 3
ComnnovEasY, Doc. No. 93.
74 See, e.g., Crvm CODE, arts. 818, 834, 871. 1052.
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limitations which form an autonomous legal system, exclusive of
the Civil Code. Fundamental to this special system is the classification of mineral resources as part of the public domain of the
Peruvian State, a type of property outside the private law system
established by the Civil Code and other statutes.
The fact that public, and not private, law is primarily involved
does not foreclose all possibility of applying Civil Code provisions to actions involving petroleum resources or to IPC's specific
case; in case of lagunae in the special laws, recourse is to the
general principles of law and equity, to the common law expressed
in the Civil Code and other general laws.7 5 Thus, there are
several crucial threshold issues to be resolved. First, given that
a special legal regime does exist for petroleum deposits, what are
its rules and how do they apply in the La Brea y Parifias case?
Are there lagunae in the special regime which must be filled by
recourse to the general sources of law? Second, are there facts
and law which might create an exception and thrust the La Brea
y Parifias subsoil petroleum deposits outside the purview of the
special legal regime and back into the general?
C. The Administrative Decision and IPC's Title Claim
The Ministry of Development and Public Works rejected
IPC's appeal without discussion of the substantive issues. However, on the presidential level denial was handed down in an
extensive opinion which represents the first definitive official
declaration of the Peruvian government's legal position in the case.
The Executive flatly denied the possibility of a private title
to the subsoil of La Brea y Pariihas, stating that petroleum deposits may be exploited only under concessions formally awarded
by the State, regardless of whatever facts and/or law a private
party might argue as an exception. 6 Normally, an enterprise
should not care whether it has absolute title to mineral resources.
Title to a depleting asset is ultimately no more valuable than a
simple concession, provided that the exploiter plans to exhaust
the minerals in question and taxes are not a factor. However, in
the La Brea y Pariflascase, IPC enjoyed a special tax regime at
75

1964).
70

ALZAmORA VALDEZ, I-NTODUCCION A LA CIENCdA DEL DERECHO, 267

S.R. 095-EM, Aug. 6, 1969, in 3 CoTrnovwmsY, Doc. No. 109.

Lima,
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least in part because of the claim that it and its predecessors
made to absolute title rights in the subsoil. IPC was not willing

to abandon that claim until its special tax regime became more
onerous than that available under a common concession.
In
addition, IPC's title claim currently represents the only justification outside of equity for its presence as exploiter of the field for
forty-four years. No specific concession was ever granted for
petroleum operations in La Brea y Pariflas. The Arbitration
Award of 1922, which created the unique arrangement under
which IPC operated there, was annulled by Law No. 14696 in
1963 and, while jurists may debate the validity of that unilateral
action academically, 78 the Award is almost certainly void ab initio
before the Peruvian courts, since the Supreme Court recognized
Law No. 14696 as one of the bases for rejecting IPC's habeas
corpus.

79

Peruvian commentators support the Executive's categorical
rejection of even the possibility of absolute private title to subsoil petroleum. They contend that the eminent domain of the
State over petroleum and other mineral resources creates a special
status for such property within the "public domain," inherent

(inmanente)in the State and inalienable.80 They cite earlier cases
77 See Petition of IPC to Director of Petroleum, Aug. 8, 1957; S.R. of Nov. 18,
19577 (rejecting petition).
8 Two distinguished Brazilian jurists have dealt with the problem, on IPC's
side. See CARNEmo, DICTAMTMN JUlnrco SOBRE EL LAD O AB3BIRAL DE LA BxAv
Y PAPiNAs, both in OsonEs, et. al., LA BnrA Y PA
As 57, 67 (1963).
On the other side see, Castafiedt, "Andlisis del Lauda que Prtendi6 Poner
Fin a la Controversia 'La Brea y Parifias"'
"
28 REv. DE DEmBEao v GIENCrAs
PorcAs 5, (1964). In 1960 a commission including such Peruvians as Victor
Andr6s Belafimde (once President of the United Nations General Assembly), Jos6
Luis Bustamante y Rivero (President of International Court of Justice), and
Alberto Ulloa (author of a much-heralded text on Public International Law)
found that "the 1922 agreements are essentially defective (viciados en su esencia),
but what cannot be ignored is that they have created a status that has been in
effect for 38 years, and a unilateral decision on points which might have been
subject to international decision ... would be undesirable."
79 See Exp. 939/68, S.R., Jan. 3, 1969 (Corte Suprema, la. Sala).
s0 Properties of the State are divided by most treatises into three classes:
public use (roads, parks, rivers); public benefit (mines, other concessions); and
private use of the State (offices, vehicles, furnishings). The most problematical
classification is that of public benefit, which may involve elements of both the
others. However, in the La Brea y Parifias case it is essential that the minerals in
question fall into the public domain, for private use property of the State is probably subject to all the rules governing treaties between private individuals, i.e.,
the CVnIL CODE.
The chief exponent of the Peruvian argument placing the mine in the public
domain is Castafieda, in Andlisis del Derecho de Propiedad sobre La Brea y
Pariflas, supra note 4, [hereinafter cited as Castafieda, Propiedad]. Z&ate Polo
(Continued on next page)
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of mines which were "sold" to private parties by the Crown but,
on judicial review, were pronounced no more than perpetual
concessions. "Owners" continued to pay all taxes and respect
all obligations of the concessionaire. 81 This construction is derived
from a long and unvarying series of laws which provided that
mineral resources are the State property and may be exploited
only under express governmental authorization and payment of
the proper tax (canon). In Spanish legislation, this rule may date
from the year 1128 and the promulgation of the Fuero Viejo de
Castilla;most colonial legislation clearly reserved title to minerals
to the Crown. 2 Curiously, the law was probably the same under
the Inca, before Pizarro arrived in Peru.m It has been the rule of
all the mining codes enacted by the Peruvian Republic and has
been included in the country's petroleum codes since their inception in 1873.1 Peru has never had a general law which recognized
private parties' rights to more than a concession in subsoil petroleum resources.
Peru is not alone in its legal stand against private title to
minerals. There is unanimity throughout those Latin American
nations in which mineral wealth plays an important role in the
economy.85 Although at one time three of the countries-Mexico,8 6
Colombia, 87 and Brazil, 88--permitted the owner of the surface
automatic and complete title to the subsoil rights as well, all have
since abolished that possibility.
Against the imposing legislative tradition to which the com(Footnote continued from preceding page)

might not go quite so far in his Impugnaciftn a la Tesis de la InternationalPetroleum
Co. sobre la Propiedad Absoluta que se Atribuye, del Subsuelo y de los Yacimientor Petroliferos de 'La Brae y Parifias, 18 REv. DE JURISPRUDENCIA PERUANA
458, 482 (1960). Most of the following legislative history is from Castafieda's
article, verified by the author's research. But see OsoRsS, et. al., LA BnmA Y
PAImwAs: Discutsos A=TE EL. SENsAo (LEcisrATumA EXrMAOPnn.IAWA DE 1917) 5
(1963). An excellent source book is VELARDE, HISTORTA DEL DERECHO DE MnVERIA
HxsPANo-A.AmucANo (Buenos Aires, 1919).
81
See Z~rate Polo, supra note 80 at 459; Castafieda, Propiedad at 12.
82
See especially, NovisnsA RECOPILACION, LmRO IX, Trruo XVIII, LEY 1;
ORDENANZAS DE MINErIA DE NuEVA ESPANA, Trruto V, AnTS. 1-2; TrrutLo VI, ART.
1, INC.
22; Castafieda, Propiedad, at 6-9.
83
Castafieda, Propiedad,at 13 and authority cited therein.
84 These were the codes of April 28, 1873 and Jan. 12, 1877, the Mining Code
of 1901,
and Petroleum Law No. 11780 of March 12, 1952.
8
5 See, e.g., DiAz et. al., Dommio Y JURISDICCION DEL STUBSUELo, PnUnMERA
PAmRT86 (1960), including three studies of the question.
Law of June 4, 1892, arts. 4-5; Law of Nov. 22, 1884, art. 10, IV.
87
Law No. 30 of Oct. 22, 1903, art. 3; Law No. 38 of 1887, Ch. I., art. 1 (3).
88 Decree No. 4265, Jan. 15, 1921, art. 5.
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mentators point, IPC raises two exceptions which it contends
should have given it title to the La Brea y Pariihassubsoil: (1)
a specific transfer of absolute title by the government in 1826
under an explicit law in derogation of the general scheme, and
(2) prescriptive acquisition, through long and uninterrupted exercise of all title rights.
In 1825, following its successful fight for independence, the
new Peruvian Republic found itself in debt to many of its supporters. Sim6n Bolivar, as acting Chief Executive, signed a law
providing that "all class of properties, [including] mines, . . .
which belong to the State, and which may be freely disposed of,
should be applied to the extinction of the public debt."8 9 Under
this law and its subsequent regulations, the State discharged its
4,964 peso debt to Don Jos6 Antonio de Quintana by giving him
title to "the pitch mine, at Prieto Hill in the Department of Piura,
known as Amotape."9 0 The official act of transfer declared that
the State's authorized agents:
desist, quit, and part from the State which they represent, the
action, property, and domain it has in the pitch mine referred
to . . . and they cede, renounce, and sell it to the buyer or
whomever he represents, so that having the title in the form
in which they authorize it to him, he may dispose of it freely
in the manner most convenient to him .... 91
IPC traces the first of its claims to the La Brea y Parifiassubsoil
petroleum principally from the language of that nineteenth
century transaction.
To this observer, IPC's title claim cannot prosper on the
strength of what the young Peruvian government ceded to its
creditor, Quintana, almost a century and a half ago. The Peruvian commentators' argument that any transfer of absolute title
would be null ipso jure is persuasive. 2 But even if the State
89
Law of March 5, 1825.
9
0o Registry of Sale, Sept. 28, 1826, in Lima Registry; S.D. of Sept. 22, 1826.
In the latter, the department cited is La Libertad rather than Piura, but clearly
Piura is correct.
91
9 2 Auoof Sept. 30, 1826.
See Z6,rate Polo, impugnaci6n a la Tesis de lai International Petroleum Co.
sobre la PropiedadAbsoluta que se Atribuye, del Subsuelo y de los Yacimientos
Petroliferos de 'La Brea y Parifias', 18 R-v. DE JumsP uDENciA 458, 460 (1960).
Z6rate argues that the 1825 law permitted the State to sell only those mines "of
which it could freely dispose" and the regulations to the law, issued on Nov.
8, 1825, clearly specified (arts. 1 and 4) "caved-in, water-filled, or abandoned
mines" and no others.
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could have delivered a valid title giving Quintana and his successors absolute rights in subsoil petroleum, the facts and the law
indicate it probably did not do so. Whatever passed in title to
Quintana in 1826, it appears impossible to characterize it as
absolute subsoil rights general enough to include petroleum deposits lying under a surface area of over 410,000 acres, the expanse
of the present La Brea y Parifashacienda.
IPC's advocates have argued that the expansive and general
right may be inferred from the history of pitch-mining operations
in the area. In the colonial period, private parties renting from
the Spanish Crown worked the pitch flows that occurred at several
points scattered over a surface area probably even greater than
that held by IPC. The operations were carried out by individuals
who gained a monopoly over the entire area in return for the
annual rent payment. These extensive operations were often
referred to generally as the Amotape Mine, although the rental
9
agreements also included more specific boundary descriptions. 3
IPC contends that since the act of transfer to Quintana simply
described the property as the "Amotape Mine" located at "Prieto
Hill", with no statement of bounds, it must be interpreted to
conform to the extensive "Amotape Mine" described in the prior
monopoly rental agreements. Support for this position may also
be found in the fact that Quintana and the owners who followed
him apparently interpreted the title in that way and the commercial operation apparently continued for many years, over the
same territory covered by the Crown monopoly. 94 The Peruvian
government never protested the pitch-mining operation.
However, the colonial rent agreements contain other facts
which may bear on the 1826 transfer. They cite "Prieto Hill" as a
landmark establishing a single side of the area in question.95 Further, as early as 1775, Don Agustin de Ugarte paid 2,500 pesos a
year to the Crown for the pitch-collecting monopoly. In 1802,
Don Juan Crist6bal de la Cruz agreed to pay 6,000 pesos a year
for the Amotape monopoly and the pitch mines of Santa Elena in
Guayaquil, further to the north. Apparently, the rent was assigned
93
See London & Pacific Petroleum Co. Ltd., HISTORIA DE LA BREA Y PAIUNAS,
art. V (1916); 3 CoNrovERsy, appendix to Doc. No. 110; ECHECODAR GA C A,

RATEMCACION DE W INFOIME JURIDICO SOBRE EL CASO DE LA B.EA Y PAPINAs

21-24 (1960).
94 See id. at 23.
95 See 3 CoNrovmisy, appendix to Doc. No. 110.
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equally to each concession, or 3,000 pesos a year for Amotape. 6
In 1825, preparatory to the title transfer, the State valued the
mine it gave to Quintana at 2,695 pesos, although the latter
accepted it in total payment of the debt of 4,964 pesosY7 In the
meantime, the Constitution of 1823 had abolished the Crown
monopolies, so that it would not have been unnatural to sell a
piece of what had always been a unitary operation. 8 As pointed
out above, pitch-mining was still apparently a thoroughly viable
commercial enterprise and it is doubtful that an operation over so
extensive an area as IPC claims could have declined so drastically
in value between 1775 and 1825.
Even if IPC were able to establish that the Quintana title was
valid as an exception to the norm that private parties could never
take more than a concession to mineral resources and that it
covered all the surface area of the present La Brea y Parifias
hacienda, it would have to show that the "pitch mine" transferred
in 1826 included not merely pitch, which appeared at the surface,
but the liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons in the subsoil below.
The point may be debatable,9 9 but the Peruvian legislative tradition against alienation of the State's domain in mineral resources
would seem to command a strict interpretation and presumptions
which run against IPC.
The special property status created for mineral resources by
the same strong legislative tradition described above is essential
to the denial of IPC's other claims. Once petroleum resources are
classified as part of the public domain of the State, falling within
the ambit of public (instead of private) law,100 it follows logically
and properly that no prescriptive acquisition may run against the
96 Id.

See S.D., Sept. 22, 1826.
Nov. 12, 1823, art. 155.
99 Compare Echecopar, supra note 93 at 13-21 (1960) with Zfrate, supra note
80 at 461-62.
100 The public law-private law distinction, which may never concern the
common lawyer, is ingrained in the civil lawyer from the time of his first exposure
to legal education and continues throughout his professional career. It is a basic,
and important, distinction within the civil-law traditions from which Peru draws
its legal system.
The dichotomy is often drawn on the basis of civil and commercial law on
the private-law side and constitutional and administrative law on the public-law
side. Another general way of distinguishing the two is to say that Public Law deals
with relations in which the State is involved and Private Law controls relations
between private individuals.
97

98 CONSrTTrION OF
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State's title to the property,1"' that the State's claim is not even
prescribed by administrative acts such as those issued in 1887
and 1888, and that administrative (not judicial) processes will be
used for many of the relevant decisions. This simple fact, so
essential to the Civil Law traditions which make up Peru's legal
system, represents the basic answer to most of the issues raised
by IPC in its administrative appeal.
Much of IPC's difficulty throughout the administrative process
and other official proceedings stems from its attempt to apply
private-law concepts and norms, i.e., the provisions of the Civil
Code relating to property rights between private individuals, to
what are public-law issues or matters covered by special legislation. For this reason, much of the law IPC cites in support of its
positions is inapposite, no matter how the rule might favor IPC
if it could be applied. In the mass of petitions and pleadings it
submitted to the executive and judicial powers, IPC never fully
developed the threshold question of why private-law, rather than
public-law, rules should control the controversy. However, despite
the fact that most of the applicable laws favor the government
position, they do not independently resolve the case. La Brea y
Parifiasis a unique question in Peruvian law, which cannot be
resolved satisfactorily without recourse to considerations outside
the written norms.
In its treatment of IPC's administrative appeal the Supreme
Resolution of the Executive most closely resembles a brief for
the government position, especially on several of the minor
points.: 2 It would be difficult to characterize it as an objective
consideration of the facts and law involved. The Supreme Resolution does not consider any potential equities on IPC's side of the
case. Still, in any equitable treatment of the facts, IPC may
have strong arguments in its favor. For forty-four years it
operated the La Brea y Parifias fields in substantially the same
101 See Crvm CODE, arts. 822 (4), 823; PEMOLUmm CoDE, Law No. 11780 of
1952, art. 1. These more recent provisions recognize a rule extant since colonial
days, as authoritatively traced in Castafieda, supra, note 4.
102 For example, the Executive finds an admission by IPC against interest, in
a clause of the August 12, 1968, Agreement IPC signed with the Be/as'nde regime
which exonerates the company from all debts it "may have owed the Government".
In a similar vein, the Supreme Resolution finds all laws and decree-laws in question
are valid because article 132 of the Constitution provides that laws take effect the
day after their official publication. See S.R. 095-EM of Aug. 6, 1969.
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manner as any concessionaire, paying taxes to the State and
complying with most of the other substantial obligations pertaining to petroleum concessions, albeit favored by a special arrangement reducing its tax burden as set out in the Arbitration
Award of 1922. Even accepting the fact that tacit concessions do
not exist, it would seem that long practice and use might make
some sort of equitable consideration of the La Brea y Pariiias
question necessary to a creditable solution to the problem.
Reivindicaci6n itself is an ad hoc action as applied to La Brea y
Pariflas;10 3 thus an equitable balancing of interests and contributions would appear desirable. What the final result of a review
in equity might be is probably beyond the capacity of anyone's
conjecture at this time. It is doubtful that a simple solution exists;
e.g., putting IPC in the position of a common concessionaire in
1924 and simply charging the difference in taxes actually paid
and taxes which would have been paid under normal legislation
since then.1°4
It seems clear that the Peruvian Executive made its final
decision on the $690.5 million debt in the Supreme Resolution of
last August, dismissing IPO's administrative appeal. However,
that same resolution declared that IPC had available remedies
before the Judicial Power which it had not exploited.
IV.

JUDICIAL REmEDIES AvAujA1x. To

IPC

There appears to be only one truly comprehensive remedy-the
declaration action-available to IPC at the present time. The
statute of limitations has tolled on the attack which could have
been made on the limited question of the value assigned to the
Talara industrial complex for purposes of expropriation.'0 5 The
statute of limitations has also run on another frequently mentioned remedy, the interdicto de recobrar, or summary action to
103 There is some analogy for it in the present MINNG CODE OF 1950, art. 67,
which provides for reivindicaci6n between private concessionaires. The MINfNG
CODE: OF 1901 contained the same provision in article 112. See also note 66 supra.
However, some authorities would argue that the State exercises a "right of
sovereignty through administrative processes instead of proper reivindicadi6n.
See EscALA, EL Domio DEL EsTADo soBp LAS MINAs 46-47 (Chile, 1965) and

authority there cited. The substantive effect is the same.
104 See note 62 s-upra, plus the multifarious claims introduced in the legislative
bills before Congress in 1960. See ELEjALDE, et. al., LA BBA

Y

PArixAs: ExA~

(1963).
105 See Law No. 1925, June 4, 1940, art. 13; Law No. 12063, art. 9.
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recover possession. 0 6 Apparently IPC considered the latter barred
to it by the nature of the property in question 0 7 and the fact
that laws and decree-laws were the direct authority for the
possession of the La Brea y Pariiiasfields by the Revolutionary
Government. 8 In addition, the interdicto de recobrar does not
determine a party's right, but merely returns to him possession
of property from which he can show he was removed without
due process.
One means of quick access to the courts on the larger issues
would be for the Executive to consent to a judicial appeal from
its Supreme Resolution dismissing IPC's administrative appeal.
Under present circumstances, IPC has an absolute right to judicial
process only if it first pays the full amount outstanding on its
$690.5 million debt. 0° The Executive has not indicated a willingness to waive IPC's obligation to pay the debt and IPC has
never specifically asked for such a waiver."' IPC perhaps could
achieve the same substantial consideration of its case through
institution of a declarative action in the Peruvian courts, if it
wishes to exhaust the domestic remedies available to it.
Virtually all issues in the La Brea y Parifiascontroversy could
be considered in a declarative action suit, including equitable
circumstances."" If at all complicated-and it should almost
certainly be painfully complicated-the suit could drag on for
years. Such delay might not be all to IPC's disadvantage, providing that at some point a decision is actually made. IPC has
lost possession of all its Peruvian investment and holdings. It
seems unthinkable that the company entertains any hope of
establishing an enterprise in Peru in the relevant future, either
by way of resuming a part of its former operation or initiating
new ventures. At this point in time and the political context,
IPC can have realistic concern for little more than compensation
for its loss. An extended judicial consideration of all the equities
built up since 1924 may be IPC's best hope for an objective treat100 CoDE OF CIVm PROCEDURE,

107 Id. art. 992.

arts. 1010-1017.

Interview with IPC lawyers in Lima, Peru, in late September, 1969.
109 D.L. No. 17355, Dec. 31 1968 art. 8.
110 IPC did ask unsuccessfully for a waiver on another debt. See note 72 supra.
M The declarative action is not specifically provided for in the Peruvian Code
of Civil Procedure, but is normally permitted as a valid ordinary (as opposed to
summary) suit. See ALZAmORA VA. ms, DamEcHo PNocEsAL CrviL 63-65 (Lima,
1959).
108
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ment of its case. Anything short of the comprehensive treatment
available in a declarative action makes little sense, for the Peruvian
government has a number of potential debts it could press against
IPC were any single debt dismissed." 2 In fact, IPC seems indisposed to press for this sort of hearing, perhaps because it feels
the political climate makes any further appeals futile and sterile
exercises, perhaps because it does not wish to submit to the sort
of review of all its La Brea y Parifas operation that the process
would entail. On the Peruvian side, at least as reflected by the
Petro-Peru lawyers the author talked to, the prevailing view is
that the controversy is closed and a declarative action would be
useless.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the La Brea y Parifiascontroversy represents a case unique in Peruvian petroleum law. Although the Revolutionary Government moved immediately to
take the action it did once it assumed power, circumstances had
moved in that direction for years. The La Brea y Parifias case
probably generated more legal commentary and writing (wholly
leaving aside political treatments) than any other single case in
Peruvian history. Most of the issues were well-defined and fullydeveloped at least a decade ago.
Whatever other observations may be made, it seems indisputable that La Brea y Parifias is an extremely complex legal
controversy. No isolated or clearcut legal rules control the case;
rather it involves some of the most basic and far-reaching questions in the Peruvian legal system. The dichotomy between public and private law is at the heart of the matter. IPC, to a surprising degree, has relied on private-law doctrine and norms.
But, even more surprising, it has never fully discussed why it
should be private rather than public law rules which govern the
controversy. Still, IPC's advocacy throughout many years of
difficult procedures has been on the whole extremely complete
and painstaking. IPC has made an exceptional public record of
the case in all its legal aspects. The Peruvian Executive and
112 See notes 15-17, 62 supra. More of the possible debt claims are detailed
in the projects of law discussed in ELEjALDE et. a., supra note 4.
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Judiciary have accorded IPC full hearing and ample responses
on most issues in the case. However, no comprehensive judicial
consideration of the equities has been granted, and the governmental action may at times have seemed-especially to the North
American lawyer-abrupt or arbitrary in denying what other
countries might consider ordinary due process safeguards. Peru,
however, is a country in which the State is not yet treated as an
equal before justice with private citizens.
Ultimately, La Brea y Parifiasis much more a political question
than a legal question, of course. It is, unfortunately, the political
rather than the legal aspects which appear to have the greatest
impact on other countries and the treatment of foreign investment.
Although deeper study demonstrates the case is unique, it is all
too easy to look at the result-a large foreign investment in a key
extraction industry nationalized without compensation.'" The
recent Gulf Oil case in Bolivia represents such a striking parallel
in the political pronouncements that accompanied it, that, though
the basic legal issues appear totally different it seems copied
directly from the more publicized aspects of the Peruvian example.
Latin-American experts who should know better have failed to
distinguish between the cases, perpetrating an erroneous and
4
ignorant view of the case."
Even within Peru, the whole set of circumstances must be set
in political perspective to be fully understood. One should not
underestimate the intense public feeling, built up over years by
the journalism of El Comercio and other influential Lima newspapers and magazines, that La Brea y Parifiasrepresented an old
injustice perpetrated against the Peruvian nation, a score which
had to be settled. When IPC's La Brea y Parifias operation is
viewed in the light of Peruvian popular opinion, as the shameful
13 Despite the inevitable effect its action in the IPC case bad on foreign
investment, Peru's Revolutionary Government has from the first emphasized that
it was a unique case and that foreign capital is welcome in Peru. See the government pamphlets PEnROLEUM iN PE-u (No., 1969); LA PoLrricA DEL GovimNo
REvoLucioNmAO (Jan., May, Oct., 1969); LunEAMIENTOS DE LA POLnCA EcoNOMIcA-SocrAL DEL GOBrERNO REvOLUCIONAEO (1969). It appears that more
recently foreign capital may be venturing back into Peru, after a waiting period.
114 Chief offender is George Jackson Eder, in his Expropriation:Hickenlooper
and Hereafter, 4 INT'L LAwym 611, 619-23 (1970). Eder is not alone, however.
None of the relatively heavy comment engendered by The La Brea y Parifiascase
has shown much comprehension of what really went on in Peru; most have simply
assumed the Peruvians were arbitrary and capricious and proceeded from there.
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and irritating vestige of another era in foreign investment in that
country, harsh treatment of the oil company becomes more understandable, if no easier to justify.
In fact, IPC under Standard Oil ownership was at least
ostensibly a model corporate citizen, but IPC in 1971 is paying
not for its own sins, so much as for those of all its predecessors
and the Peruvian governments with which they worked. The
delay in taking definitive action during the first five years of the
Belainde regime, at a time when public attention was continually
focused on the issue, almost unquestionably increased the minimum conditions acceptable to the Peruvian populace. Thus, if the
$690.5 million debt appears blown out of all equitable proportion
as applied to a company which apparently relied, in good faith,
throughout forty-four years, on an arbitration award which lacked
only four years of expiring, its dogmatic expression-based as it is
on substantial legal foundations-may be most comprehensible
as justification for Peru's total takeover of IPC's going enterprise.
Whether Peru will bargain down from that figure at some future
date is impossible to predict, but under the legal theory invoked
any reduction in IPC's debt would be a clear concession.
If this brief article has any final message, it is simply that
Peru and the Revolutionary Government have been more responsible throughout the La Brea y Parifias controversy than many
casual observers may realize. Although the credibility of the
government may have been jeopardized by more recent arbitrary
acts, legal procedures were followed throughout the La Brea y
Pariiias affair, if not always with total equanimity. There is a
solid basis in law for all that Peru has done. If Peru has been less
than equitable in applying the full force of its law to divest an oil
company (which on the author's limited experiences was one of
its best corporate citizens in recent years) of its whole operation,
one might objectively balance this against the fact that the ultimate confrontation took place on legal grounds the company
chose not to move off of gracefully and graciously (albeit at a
high cost) when it might have had the chance.
Quite apart from the fact that official negotiations continue
between the Peruvian and the United Sates governments, perhaps
the Hickenlooper Amendment's sanctions against governments' expropriating American properties without adequate compensation
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have not been applied on the grounds that Peru did not confiscate
IPC's property but merely followed a valid legal process against
the company, which has not yet terminated. The other foreign
petroleum and other mineral concessions in Peru have not been
touched and the Conchan-Chevron habeas corpus"-5 is still good
law.
Whether, at some time during the last fifteen years, negotiation
could have resolved the complexities of the La Brea y Pariflas
case and left IPC a place among the existing concessionaires, is a
moot point. Whether at some time in the future, the controversy
may be opened through arbitration, negotiation, or a declaratory
action, and what the outcome of any such procedure might be,
are questions of sheerest conjecture. Matters are now frozen by
political considerations that leave little flexibility for compromise.
115 Note 44 supra and accompanying text.

